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Universal access to water and sanitation is a stated international development goal 
(SDGs, UN 2015).2 However, many countries around the world are still struggling to 
achieve this goal. In 2015, 29% of the world population lacked access to safely 
managed water and 61% lacked safely managed sanitation (WHO/UNICEF, 2017).3 
Well-designed subsidies stand out as a key instrument to achieve these SDGs, 
alongside other policies such as investment, technological innovations or better 
governance and planning. In the context of high levels of poverty, where markets 
alone do not result in the desired levels of service provision and consumption, 
targeted subsidies can help address affordability and equity issues. Additionally, 
water and sanitation subsidies are generally advocated because access to and 
consumption of water and sanitation services are associated with rising productivity 
and living standards, positive externalities related to public health, and may free up 
time spent collecting water (WWAP, 2016, and Hutton and Chase, 2017).4 For 
example, Hutton and Chase (2017) show that health and non-health associated costs 
due to poor water and sanitation are estimated to be over 5% of GDP in 6 of the 30 
countries included in their study.  
A subsidy represents the difference between the supplier’s cost of providing the 
service and the actual price or tariff paid by a user. Consumption subsidies reduce 
the cost of consuming water and, as such, are only available to existing customers. 
These can be distinguished from connection subsidies, which are a one-time 
reduction in connection charges and hence only available to new, previously 
unconnected, customers. Water consumption subsidies can take different shapes and 
sizes: untargeted subsidies (general underpricing of water supply that benefits all 
consumers); implicit subsidies (generated by flat fees for unmetered services, low 
meter coverage or low revenue collection); or explicit subsidies (e.g. quantity 
targeting using increasing block tariffs (IBTs) or subsidies using administrative 
selection, such as means-tested or geographic targeting). The funding for these 
subsidies comes from one or a combination of the following two sources: government 
transfers and rate funds (that arise from charging other users more than the cost of 
the service, also called cross-subsidies). Finally, the transfer mechanism could be 
implemented in different ways. In a demand-side subsidy, usually the most 
transparent type of subsidy, the government provides a monetary transfer directly to 
the user, who uses this transfer towards their payments to the service provider. In a 
supply-side subsidy, the government transfers the money to the provider.5 
 
2 The United Nations adopted the SDGs in 2015 with the aim to “achieve universal and 
equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water” and to “achieve access to adequate 
and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all” by 2030. 
3 The cost of meeting these gaps are estimated to be around $100 billion a year (Hutton and 
Varughese, 2016). 
4 Both WWAP, 2016 and Hutton and Chase, 2017 provide good summaries of the different 
studies investigating these issues and quantifying the returns to investment in water and 
sanitation in terms of different outcomes. 
5 Andres et al (2019) and Komives et al (2005) discuss the different types of WASH subsidies in 





The design and performance of piped water subsidies hinges on the industrial 
structure and technology of piped water production and delivery and is a contentious 
area, heavily influenced by political economy considerations. An important challenge 
for policymakers is to design a subsidy scheme that allows for the recovery of capital 
and expenditure costs of providing the service (WWAP, 2019). Piped water is usually 
considered a local natural monopoly. The supplier faces large upfront (fixed) costs 
(resulting in increasing returns to scale) on assets that are long-lived. This feature of 
water supply, as with other similar public utilities, makes pricing difficult. Allocative 
efficiency requires prices to be set equal to marginal cost, i.e. the good is consumed 
up to the point where the benefit consumers obtain from the last unit consumed 
equals the additional cost incurred by the supplier to produce it.  However, pricing 
at marginal cost in a context of high fixed costs would not allow for full cost recovery 
(as the marginal cost is lower than the average costs). This feature generates heated 
debates around how to implement low water tariffs (i.e. close to the marginal cost) 
while ensuring cost recovery and avoiding financial unviability of utilities.6 This, in 
part, is because it is really difficult to estimate the cost of providing each customer 
with the service, as costs vary across consumers, depending on geographic location, 
topography, distance to the source, etc. This situation translates into a high degree 
of discretion on how to allocate provision costs.  
In practice, this often means subsidization of the service across the board. Most 
countries, whether rich or poor, end up putting in place subsidies schemes funded by 
the government or designing tariffs so that richer consumers cross-subsidize poorer 
ones (GWI, 2004, Komives et al., 2005, and Andres et al, 2019). New estimates by 
Andres et al (2019) put total subsidies for networked water and sewerage services at 
around 0.5% of GDP worldwide, and over 1.5% of GDP for non-advanced economies. In 
developing countries, this subsidization across the board does not fully address the 
objectives of universal access to clean water and the affordability of the service, and 
additionally may distort consumption patterns. Furthermore, high subsidization levels 
have often undermined the financial sustainability of the system, inducing managers 
to face soft budget constraints and lowering their financial performance.7  
In this paper, we provide new evidence on the distributional incidence and pro-poor 
targeting of subsidies for piped water consumption for 10 low and middle-income 
countries around the world: Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda, El Salvador, 
Jamaica, Panama, Bangladesh, and Vietnam. We also document the gap between 
estimates of actual paid tariffs and tariffs that would be needed to recover the full 
cost of providing the service (also called cost-recovery or cost-reflective tariffs). All 
these countries capture relevant heterogeneity since they reflect different levels of 
gross domestic product per capita, connection rates, tariff structures and cost-
recovery tariffs. The cases considered include quantity-based tariffs and flat rates. 
Importantly, in these countries there is availability of household surveys with 
 
6 In the context of lower income countries, it is recommended that tariffs cover at least the 
operating expenditures incurred by suppliers, but even this is often not achieved (see, for 
instance, Baietti and Curiel, 2005 and Andres et al, 2019). 
7 This, in turn, could reduce the ability of service providers to access commercial finance, 
which could enable utilities’ ability to maintain and expand the service in an affordable 





measures of water expenditure and overall consumption expenditures, as well as 
administrative data on tariffs from the utility and new estimates of country-specific 
cost-reflective tariffs.8 
Our results suggest that, in all the countries analyzed, mean unit prices charged are, 
on average, lower than the overall cost of producing and distributing piped water, 
resulting in substantial water consumption subsidies. In addition, subsidies tend to be 
regressive, with the amount of resources allocated to water consumption subsidies 
increasing over the expenditure distribution, and richer households in the top deciles 
usually capturing the lion’s share. On average, across the 10 low and middle-income 
countries examined, 56% of subsidies end up in the pockets of the richest 20% but 
only 6% of subsidies find their way to the poorest 20%. 
Our findings also highlight the importance of access to the service in explaining the 
regressive nature of these subsidies. In particular, i) poor households live in areas 
that are not covered by piped water networks,9 ii) poor households live in areas with 
coverage but are not connected to the network, and iii) poor households that are 
connected to the network appear to be consuming smaller quantities of water than 
the general population. This implies that there are high errors of inclusion (i.e. 
households not among the 40% poorest receiving subsidies) and even higher errors of 
exclusion (households among the 40% poorest not receiving subsidies). This issue is 
particularly pronounced in the considered African countries, where errors of 
exclusion fall between 90 and 100 percent. 
Our study contributes to a vast and growing literature on the distributional incidence 
of fiscal policy in low- and middle-income countries, including a large sub-literature 
on the distributional incidence of water subsidies. Our findings are consistent with a 
number of previous studies that use a similar methodology. Key examples of this 
literature—such as Komives et al. (2006) and Angel-Urdinola and Wodon (2007b)—
have shown that quantity-based, targeted subsidies in Nicaragua, Cape Verde, the 
city of Kathmandu (Nepal), Bangalore (India), and Sri Lanka are usually regressive, 
with a smaller share of benefits accruing to the poor than the general population. 
These studies also indicate that poor targeting is mostly associated with low rates of 
access to water networks in poor neighborhoods, as well as low connection rates for 
poor households in neighborhoods with access. More recently, the World Bank (2017) 
found that Tunisian households in the bottom quintile of the income distribution 
receive 11 percent of water subsidies, while the top quintile receive 27 percent. Our 
study provides systematic cross-country evidence, using a novel and more robust 
estimate of cost-recovery tariffs based on actual country-specific water providers’ 
data.  
Lack of access to the service by the poor has been identified as an important driver 
of regressive subsidies in other sectors. There are numerous studies documenting 
similar patterns in the electricity sector as documented by Komives et al (2006). 
 
8 These estimates are calculated using an improved methodology and new data presented in 
Andres et al (2019). 
9 Poor households are defined as belonging to the first four deciles of the countrywide 





Recent studies conducted as part of the Commitment to Equity (CEQ) initiative 
looking at the distributional incidence of fiscal policy in a range of low- and middle-
income countries also confirm these findings using a different methodology (see for 
instance, Hounsa et al, 2019, for energy subsidies in Mali). CEQ studies, discussed in 
Inchauste and Lustig (2017), find that lack of access by the poor to tertiary education 
is one of the reasons why public education expenditure is regressive in Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Guatemala and Indonesia. Access also plays a role in the distributional 
incidence of health subsidies. For example, Chen et al, 2015, find that Chinese 
government healthcare subsidies are pro-rich and regressive, and that lack of access 
plays an important role. O’Donnell et al (2008) show the distribution of public health 
care subsidies in Vietnam is pro-rich, although the impact varies by type of health 
care facility. 
Finally, quantity-based consumption subsidies have been found to be regressive, even 
conditional on having access and being connected to the network. For example, 
Cardenas and Wittington (2019) use data for connected households in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia and find that water and electricity quantity-based subsidies are large and 
regressive. They use improved measures of quantities consumed by accessing 
administrative utilities billing data and matching it to household survey data. In 
contrast, when subsidies are targeted using administrative-based mechanisms (i.e. 
geographic targeting or means-testing), the evidence suggests that these are likely to 
be more progressive and pro-poor (Komives et al., 2006). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents the methodology, 
the data used, and related statistics; section 3 presents the findings; and the last 
section summarizes the findings and discusses the policy implications. 
2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In order to estimate consumption subsidies for piped water at the household level, 
we need a measure of the cost of delivering a unit (cubic meter, m3) of piped water, 
a measure of the unit price actually paid by each household and the quantity 
consumed. To do this, we combine several data sources spanning different periods 
within and across countries. We use a methodology that closely follows Komives et 
al. (2005) and Angel-Urdinola and Wodon (2007a), to estimate the distributional and 
targeting performance of subsidies in each country.  
We first describe the multiple data sources used, and then explain the methodology 
and its implementation. We subsequently provide some descriptive statistics before 
discussing the limitations of the data and methodology used in this study. 
2.1 Data sources  
2.1.1 Household surveys (source 1) 
Household level data comes from the latest available socio-economic (or income and 
expenditure) household surveys collected in each country. Most surveys are from 





Jamaica. Information about the household surveys used for each country considered 
in the analysis is provided in the Appendix (Table A1). 
These are general socio-economic surveys that cover a range of dimensions of a 
household’s characteristics and income and spending patterns, and hence are not 
focused specifically on water and sanitation. Nonetheless, they provide useful self-
reported information on water access, connection, and water expenditure in the last 
month or last year, depending on the survey. Details about the exact variables used 
in each survey are also provided in the appendix. Quantities of consumed water and 
prices or tariffs paid by each household are usually not reported. Consequently, we 
combine household survey data on water expenditure with administrative data from 
providers and government programs detailing the tariff structure for water and 
sewerage services to impute water quantities and tariffs, as below.  
This approach has been used in other studies, such as in Komives et al (2006) and 
Angel-Urdinola and Wodon (2007b). However, it is not without limitations. In 
particular, water expenditure in the last month (some surveys asked about 
expenditure over the last 12 months) can provide an imperfect proxy for the 
expenditure on piped water if: i) households use multiple water sources, including 
technologies for treating non-piped water (in which case it could overestimate piped 
water expenditure); ii) meters are not read, shared10 or do not work; or iii) the water 
bill includes pro-rated connection charges and arrears (Whittington et al, 2015). 
Importantly, these surveys also enable the construction of total expenditure (and/or 
income) variables for each household. 
2.1.2 Administrative data on tariff structures (source 2) 
Information about tariff structures comes from the International Benchmarking 
Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities (IBNET) database. Some countries list most 
of their water providers in IBNET while others list only a few. For example, IBNET has 
data on the tariff structures of all water providers in Jamaica, Mali and Niger, since 
these have only one piped water provider. Meanwhile, for countries such as Ethiopia, 
Nigeria, Uganda, and Bangladesh—where the provision of services is decentralized 
and there are a multitude of piped-water utilities—IBNET data covers a subgroup of 
these providers. An additional limitation is that the tariff structure data available to 
the authors for this study may cover a period that is different than the one covered 
in the household survey for each country, even though tariffs may not be regularly 
updated. More information about dates covered for each utility in each country is 
provided in the Appendix. 
2.1.3 Data on cost-reflective tariffs (source 3) 
Cost-reflective tariffs cover the capital and recurrent costs of providing service, 
including not only the efficient economic cost but also costs arising from 
 
10 Table A2 in the Appendix shows the proportion of households that use the neighbor’s tap as 
their main source of drinking water for the 4 countries for which the data is available: Mali, 
Niger, El Salvador and Panama. The proportion is low and varies between 1% for all 
households in Panama and rural households in Niger, to 10% for urban households in Niger and 





inefficiencies of the service provider. We use estimates of cost-reflective tariffs 
(defined as CRT) that cover both operating expenditure (OPEX) and capital 
expenditure (CAPEX), obtained from Andres et al (2019).  
Their approach entails answering the following question “What is the long-run 
incremental cost of providing water and sanitation services for a given company?”. It 
is based on a simple, utility-wide, bottom-up model used by regulators in many 
utility sectors. In the water and sanitation sector the model firm approach is used in 
Chile and a few other Latin-American countries. The authors choose efficient firm 
estimates from Chile as a benchmark11 to determine the capital stock per customer. 
Using information on operation and maintenance costs for the period 2010-15 from 
the IBNET dataset, they estimate efficient cost-reflective tariffs. In addition, this 
approach accounts for inefficiencies arising from employees and losses, to obtain a 
total cost-reflective tariff. Despite its stringent assumptions and simplifications, this 
comprehensive approach improves on the existing estimates that have been used in 
the literature.12 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Definition of variables of interest  
In the following subsections we describe how we classify households by economic 
status (i.e., poor or not), identify whether they benefit from water consumption 
subsidies, and estimate the magnitude of the subsidies they receive. All household 
level statistics are calculated using sampling weights to correct for the bias inherent 
in representative household surveys (Deaton, 2019). Further information on how each 
variable is constructed for each country is provided in the appendix. 






11 The Chilean tariff law seeks to induce efficiency through the use of incremental cost of 
development pricing. Decree - D.F.L. No 70/1988 – defines this tariff as the “value equivalent 
to a constant per unit price which, when being applied to the incremental forecasted 
demand, generate revenues to cover incremental operation efficient costs and the required 
investment from an optimized project of expansion of the firm, such that it should be 
consistent with a net present value (NPV) of the project equal to zero.”  As pointed out by 
Bitran et al (2005): “In Chile, to avoid transferring the cost of inefficiencies to users, the rate 
setting process emulates competitive conditions by using a fictitious company that would 
theoretically meet demand over the next five years in the most efficient way.” 
12 For example, the Price Gap Approach uses a single uniform CRT value for all countries of 
1,27 USD/m3. There are a range of papers by IMF staff that have used this approach to 
calculate implicit subsidies to public utilities. Recently Kochar et al. (2015) have applied it to 
networked water while Ebeke and Ngouana (2015) used it to estimate energy subsidies. 
Another methodology, known as the Hidden Cost Calculator (Ebinger, 2004), uses book values 





Figure 1. Classification of households according to piped water access, connection 
and consumption subsidy beneficiary 
 
2.2.1.1 POOR HOUSEHOLDS (P) AND ALL HOUSEHOLDS (H) 
Poor households are defined as belonging to the first four deciles of the countrywide 
national total expenditure (or income) per capita distribution in each country, and 
are denoted by the subscript p. All households in each country are denoted by the 
subscript h. 
Total expenditure includes expenditure on all goods and services, including the water 
bill, which is a common methodology to rank households according to their resources 
in developing countries.13 Annual expenditure figures are converted to equivalent 
monthly figures. It is important to note that although we conduct our analysis at the 
household level, we construct deciles of expenditure (or income) on the basis of a 
household’s per capita expenditure, not overall household expenditure. Because we 
conducted our analysis of expenditure at the household level—and average household 
size may vary across deciles, particularly in Africa—average total expenditure at the 
household level may not increase as expected when moving across the household per 









Table 1. Main variables of interest 
Variable Definition Sources 
P (Poor) =1 if a household belongs to the first four deciles of the countrywide national 
total expenditure (or income) per capita distribution in each country. 
Subscript p is to indicate it is a poor household. Letter P is the total number 
of poor households. 
1 
H (All) =1 for all households.  





= 1 if a household h is located in a neighborhood with at least one other 
household with a water connection as self-reported in the household survey. 
Neighborhood is proxied by the enumeration area. 
1 
Connected Ch =1 if a household h is connected to the water network, and zero otherwise. 
This is determined by the self-reported main source of drinking water. 
1 





Estimated monthly water consumed (in m3) conditional on being connected 
1 & 2 
UPh|C Unit price for a m3 of water for a household h: Eh|C/ Qh 1 & 2 
Bh =1 if a household h receives a subsidy: UPh|C<CRT  1,2 & 3 
BP Total number of poor households receiving a subsidy (poor beneficiaries) 1,2 & 3 
BH Total number of households receiving a subsidy (all beneficiaries) 1,2 & 3 
Rh The rate of subsidization for a household h: 1-UPh/CRT 1,2 & 3 
Sh Amount of subsidy received by a household h: Qh|B x (CRT-Uph) 1,2 & 3 
SP Total amount of subsidies accrued to the poor 1,2 & 3 
SH Total amount of subsidies accrued to all households 1,2 & 3 
Variables to construct Omega 
SAP % of poor households that are located in a service area 1,2 & 3 
SAH % of all households that are located in a service area 1,2 & 3 
CP|SA % of poor households that are connected conditional on being located in a 
service area 
1,2 & 3 
CH|SA % of all households that are connected conditional on being located in a 
service area 
1,2 & 3 
BP|C % of poor households with a subsidy, conditional on being connected 1,2 & 3 
BH|C % of all households with a subsidy, conditional on being connected 1,2 & 3 
RP|B Average rate of subsidization for poor households, conditional on receiving a 
subsidy 
1,2 & 3 
RH|B Average rate of subsidization for all households, conditional on receiving a 
subsidy 
1,2 & 3 
QP|B Average quantities consumed by poor households, conditional on receiving a 
subsidy 
1,2 & 3 
QH|B Average quantities consumed by all households, conditional on receiving a 
subsidy 



















1,2 & 3 
 
2.2.1.2 SERVICE AREA (SA) 
Following Angel-Urdinola and Wodon (2007a), households are considered to have 
potential access to a network if they are located in a service area (SAh).14 A 
 
14 The variable service area (SA) is equivalent to the variable access (A) in Komives et al. 
(2005) and Angel-Urdinola and Wodon (2007a). In this paper we prefer to use service area, 





household’s service area takes the value of 1 if at least one household in their 
neighborhood self-reported having a water connection in the household survey. We 
assume that households in a SA have the option of connecting to the piped-water 
network present in their neighborhood. The neighborhood is proxied by the 
enumeration area where the household is located, according to the household 
surveys. However, this assumption may not always be correct. If a neighborhood 
covers a large geographical area, or if the presence of an adjacent water main varies 
by household, the survey figures may overestimate the actual number of households 
with potential access to the piped water network. 
2.2.1.3 CONNECTED (C) 
We set this variable to 1 if a household is connected to the water network, and to 
zero otherwise. This is determined by the self-reported main source of drinking 
water in the household surveys. 
2.2.1.4 QUANTITY OF WATER CONSUMED AMONG THOSE CONNECTED (Q) 
We construct Qh|C, the monthly water quantity consumed (measured in m3) by 
imputing water consumption volumes from self-reported household monthly water 
expenditure, Eh|C, conditional on being connected to the network. The conversion is 
undertaken using the corresponding tariff structure from the IBNET data.15   
In the first round of calculations, we impute quantities for households for which (i) 
the total monthly bill for water consumption depends on quantities consumed, (ii) 
the value of self-reported expenditure on water is greater than zero, and (iii) we can 
map the household to a specific provider for which we have tariff structure 
information. For households that pay a fixed rate per cubic meter, the monthly 
quantity of water consumed equals the total expenditure on water divided by the 
rate. For households facing unit prices that vary by quantity consumed (such as 
increasing block or volume-differentiated tariffs), each block within the tariff 
structure is assigned a maximum expenditure level and associated quantity of water 
consumed. Then quantities are assigned to the household sample by matching self-
reported household water expenditure with the corresponding level of the tariff 
structure data.  
For the remainder of the households for which (i) the bill is a flat rate unrelated to 
water quantities consumed; or (ii) self-reported expenditure on water equals zero,16 
we assume consumption quantities at the median of those households in the same 
country for which we could impute quantities.  
For those households that report being connected to the piped water network but are 
located in areas for which we cannot map them to a specific provider, we use the 
median water quantity consumed for those we could impute the quantity 
 
15 Information on how this match is done for each country is provided in the appendix. 
16 In many countries, and particularly Ethiopia and Nigeria, many households appear to be 
connected to the network and use piped water as their main source of drinking water but 
report paying zero for their water. Anecdotal evidence supports the fact that many 
households are connected illegally to the network or that utilities do not invoice and collect 





(disaggregated by rural/urban and income deciles if enough observations are 
available). 
Table A1 in the Appendix shows the breakdown of the sample according to whether 
connected households are matched to corresponding volumetric tariffs and have 
positive water expenditures, allowing for the estimation of quantity consumed, or 
whether water quantities and unit price paid have to be assumed using the 
information from other households in the data. The proportion of observations 
relying upon requiring the latter approach varies across countries significantly, with 
Nigeria and Bangladesh exhibiting the highest proportions.   
2.2.1.5 AVERAGE UNIT PRICE OF WATER PAID AMONG THOSE CONNECTED (UP) 
We define the unit price for a household h (UPh) as the ratio of self-reported water 
expenditure from household surveys and quantity consumed. For a household with a 
water expenditure of zero, the unit price would also be zero. 
2.2.1.6 SUBSIDY BENEFICIARIES AMONG THOSE CONNECTED (B) 
We define variable Bh as equal to 1 if a household is connected and pays a unit price 
(UPh) for water that is lower than the cost-reflective tariff. That is, a household is a 
subsidy beneficiary. 
2.2.1.7 VALUE OF THE SUBSIDY (S) 
The monthly value of the subsidy (Sh) is constructed using the variables described 
above; for each household, this is equal to Sh = Qh|B x (CRT – UPh), conditional on 
UPh<CRT (i.e., Bh = 1). 
2.2.1.8 RATE OF SUBSIDIZATION (R) 
The rate of subsidization for a household h, conditional on receiving a subsidy, is Rh|B 
= 1 – Eh|B/(Qh|B x CRT) = 1 – UPh/CRT. 
2.2.2 Distributional incidence of subsidies 
Having identified beneficiary households (Bh) and the size of subsidies (Sh) they 
receive, we estimate the share of total subsidies accrued to each expenditure (or 
income) decile and consider whether they are progressive or not.17   
1) Progressive subsidies: Subsidies are considered progressive when the share of 
subsidies accrued to each decile tend to decrease over the expenditure (or 
income) per capita distribution. This means that poor households capture a 
higher portion of the subsidy pie.   
2) Regressive subsidies: Conversely, subsidies are considered regressive when 
the share of subsidies accrued to each decile tend to increase over the 
expenditure (or income) distribution. 
 
17 This methodology is arithmetic, nonbehavioral, and express a partial equilibrium, which is 
well suited to investigate the incidence of subsidies at a point in time or with small marginal 
changes to prices or subsidies. This approach has limitations related to bigger changes in 
prices or subsidies. See, for instance, Abramovsky and Phillips (2015) for a description of 





This relationship can sometimes be non-monotonic. In those cases, it is useful to 
compare the share of subsidies that the top decile receives relative to, for example, 
the bottom 40% of the distribution, which is known as the Palma ratio and widely 
used in developing countries (Cobham et al, 2016). Or the 20/20 ratio, the share of 
subsidies the top two deciles receive relative to the bottom 20% of the distribution. 
The higher the ratio, the more regressive the subsidies are.  
We also estimate the share of overall countrywide household-level expenditure on 
goods and service captured by each decile to contrast with the share of piped water 
subsidy captured by each decile. This helps understand whether the subsidy is 
inequality reducing – that is, whether a greater percentage of subsidies is allocated 
to households in poorer deciles than is the case for overall country-wide expenditure. 
When the subsidy distribution is more skewed toward richer deciles than the 
distribution of expenditure or income, the subsidy regressive and increases 
inequality. However, if subsidies are less regressive than the distribution of 
expenditure or income, they still can reduce inequality.18 
2.2.3 Targeting performance of subsidies and underlying mechanisms 
Following Angel-Urdinola and Wodon (2007a), we define the targeting performance 
indicator (Ω), which relates to a subsidy’s distributional incidence, as the ratio 
between the amount of subsidies the poor receive (SP ) and the amount of subsidies 
accrued to all households (SH), divided by the proportion of poor households in the 
total population (P/H). 
The targeting performance indicator (Ω) can be split into factors related to water 
network access and factors related to subsidy design, using the variables defined in 

















          (Equation 1) 
Access factors (SA and C) are fixed in the short term, since they are determined by 
network expansion and households’ decisions, and will affect the distributional 
incidence of the subsidy, regardless of the consumption subsidy’s type or structure. 
Two additional measures to assess the targeting performance of subsides are the 
errors of inclusion and exclusion.  
The error of exclusion (EE) is the share of households in poverty that are not 
benefiting from the subsidy: EE = 1 - (BP/P) = (P - BP)/P 
The error of inclusion (EI) is the share of beneficiary households that are not in 
poverty: EI = BNP/BH = BNP/(BP + BNP). Figure 2 shows graphically how these errors are 
defined. 
 
18 These measures are simple statistics that can be easily displayed in bar charts, and are 

















Note: BP = number of targeted (beneficiary) households in poverty; BNP = number of targeted 
(beneficiary) households not in poverty; BH = number of total beneficiary or targeted households; P = 
number of poor households; NP = number of households not in poverty. The error of exclusion is EE = 1 - 
(BP/P) = (P - BP)/P. The error of inclusion is EI = BNP/BH = BNP/(BP + BNP). 
 
2.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics regarding household connection to piped 
water for each country analyzed. Countries are ordered by descending levels of GDP 
per capita (column 1). The figures reported in columns 2 to 6 are from household 
surveys, and are therefore nationally representative, with the exception of 
Vietnam.19 Overall, richer countries tend to have a lower proportion of households 
living in rural areas and a higher proportion of households that report using piped 
water as their main source of drinking water.20 Despite wide variation in coverage 
across countries, all countries demonstrate higher connection levels in urban 
households than both rural and poor ones.21 Notably, Nigeria’s connection rates are 
quite low given the country’s income per capita, but disparities among different 
population segments are smaller. Latin American countries have substantially higher 
connection rates, between 70 and 95 percent for the general population, and around 
50 percent or over for rural and poor households. Vietnam falls in the middle, with a 
connection rate of 53 percent for the whole population and 70 percent for urban 
households. 
 
19 In Vietnam, the survey includes only five regions: Hanoi City, Da Nang, Dak Nong, Thu Dau 
Mot City and Bình Dương Province, and Ho Chi Min City. 
20 There may be slight differences from the Joint Monitoring Program (JMP) data for each 
country, due to some minor differences in variable definitions in most cases and differences 
in sources in others. One common difference between our computation and JMP’s 
computation is that we define a household as connected to piped water if it uses piped water 
as its main source of drinking water either in the dry or wet season. JMP also includes public 
standpipes as part of its piped water definition in some countries such as Ethiopia and Mali, 
whereas we include only house connections. Thus, our figures may be easily compared against 
JMP figures showing house connections only. For example, figures for Ethiopia and Nigeria are 
slightly higher in Table 2 (19.8 percent and 13.6 percent, respectively, in column 3) than 
those presented by JMP (15.2 percent and 12.2 percent, respectively).   
21 As one might expect, there are also wide variations across the administrative geographic 
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Table 3 summarizes the number of providers from the IBNET dataset whose service 
areas are also covered in the household surveys, the average cost-reflective tariffs, 
and imputed unit prices (conditional on the reporting of positive expenditure on 
water). More information about IBNET data for each country can be found in the 
appendix. Most countries have IBT structures, though two African countries – Nigeria 
and Uganda – have fixed rates. In Bangladesh some service providers charge a flat 
water-consumption rate while others use IBT. El Salvador is the only country that has 
a volume-differentiated tariff (VDT) structure. Some countries or providers also add a 
value added tax (VAT) on tariffs. For the analysis carried out in the following section, 
we use all the households included in every country’s household survey, coupled with 
information from the corresponding utilities. As explained earlier in this section, 
when a household is located in an area or region with no available tariff structure, 
we use information from other households in that country to impute quantities and 


















in rural areas (%) 
Households connected to 
network water                    
(piped water on plot) (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   Total Rural Urban Poor 
Panama (2015) 29,446 30 91.9 79.3 97.3 82.6 










53.0 28.8 70.2 50.4 





13.6 2.8 41.3 4.7 
Mali (2014) 2,198 67 11.1 2.2 29.6 0.9 
Ethiopia (2016) 1,896 73 19.8 3.5 63.9 2.4 
Uganda (2014) 1,753 75 8.7 1.8 29.1 0.9 
Niger (2014) 838 83 9.1 0.8 49.7 0.1 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using several socio-economic household surveys, detailed in Table A1 
in the appendix, and World Bank Data series. 
Note: These are countrywide figures. Poor households are defined as belonging to the first four deciles 
of the expenditure (or income) distribution in each country. All figures are calculated using sample 
weights. Water connection and public tap variables are derived from questions about main source of 
drinking water—but some countries have information about source of water for other uses (like 
Bangladesh), which are then also used to construct water connection. More information can be found in 
the appendix. Column 1 refers to GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2017 international U.S. dollars), GDP = 




Remarkably, all countries show higher cost-reflective tariffs than the average unit 
price paid by all households that report paying a positive amount for piped water. 
This already shows that all countries’ providers operate in a way that, on average, 
subsidizes residential consumers. However, six out of the ten countries show a unit 
price higher than the estimated CRT-Opex, suggesting that they can at least cover 
operating expenditures. 
 
22 The figures for rural Vietnam using the 2015 Vietnam Household Registration Survey (VHRS) 
are much higher than the figures presented in JMP, using the Household Living Standards 
Survey (HLSS) 2012 that shows a rural rate of 13 percent. This is likely due to differences in 
the regional coverage of each survey. The VHRS 2015 has a sample that is representative of 
the population in five provinces—Ho Chi Minh City, Ha Noi, Da Nang, Binh Duong, and Dak 
Nong—while the HLSS 2012 is supposed to be nationally representative. 
23 The figures for urban and total are higher than the figures published in JMP for the latest 
year. The data for Bangladesh used in this analysis differ from the data used in JMP. We use 
the Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2016, and the figures presented here are 
consistent with the official figures published in the Preliminary Report on Household Income 
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2.29 0.37 1.04 




some with a 
fixed rate 




1.89 0.37 0.86 




10 m3 or 
less 
0.85 0.19 0.32 
Jamaica 1 IBT 2.51 0.55 1.69 




16 with flat 
rate) 
0.49 0.12 0.26 
Vietnam 3 
IBT (+ VAT 
for some) 
2.70 0.62 0.38 
Source: IBNET database, World Bank, and other resources. 
Note: Column 1: These are providers that covered areas included in the household surveys and for which 
there are available data online. Most of the data come from IBNET; however, for Nigeria, we use 
Abubakar (2016). Ethiopia: Data are from 2007 for Dire Dawa, and 2014 for Addis Ababa. The estimated 
cost-reflective tariff (column 3) is an average for the country cost-reflective tariff including both OPEX 
and CAPEX and is estimated in Andres et al (2019), except for (a) Ethiopia (we use averages across the 
24 Sub-Saharan African countries included in the estimation of Andres et al (2019)—but excluding 
Ethiopia, since the values for the cost-reflective tariffs for this particular country seem unrealistically 
high due to some problems with the raw data from Ethiopia used to estimate cost-reflective tariffs); (b) 
El Salvador (data from ANDA are used); (c) Panama (data from the Autoridad Nacional de Servicios 
Públicos are used for OPEX cost-reflective tariffs for the year 2015 in U.S. dollars and divided by 0.22, 
which is the relationship between the average of the OPEX cost-reflective tariffs across countries from 
Andres et al (2019), and the average of total cost-reflective tariffs across countries from the same 
paper); and (d) Jamaica (National Water Commission). There are no available data on OPEX cost-
reflective tariffs for El Salvador and Jamaica (column 4), thus we use the value in column 3 for the total 
cost-reflective tariff, multiplying it by 0.22, which is the ratio between the average OPEX cost-reflective 
tariff and average total cost-reflective tariff from Andres et al (2019). Column 5 shows the unit price 
conditional on paying for water services (i.e., self-reported expenditure on water greater than zero). 
The figure is calculated using sampling weights. CRT = cost-reflective tariff; CRTopex = OPEX cost-
reflective tariff; IBT = increasing block tariff; m3 = cubic meter; OPEX = operating expenditure; VAT = 







2.4 Limitations and strengths  
The study presents limitations that must be taken into account when interpreting the 
findings, many of which have already been discussed. The study also has important 
strengths. We summarize them below. 
Due to data constraints, the data used spans different periods within each country. 
For example, household data for Jamaica is from 2012 whereas the tariff data is from 
2013. Or within Nigeria, we have data on tariffs structures for 9 regional providers, 
spanning from 2012 to 2018, while the household data is from 2015/16.   
The data on water expenditure is self-reported and can sometimes include 
expenditure not only on piped water but also other water sources. If the piped water 
supply is shared with other households, water expenditure figures may not accurately 
reflect the amount paid by the reporting household. Since this variable is used to 
impute the quantity of water consumed and the average unit price paid by 
households, these variables can suffer from inaccuracies. For example, if 
expenditure is overestimated, then quantities will be overestimated. If the 
measurement issue varies with the level of income of households, this could be 
biasing our results for those households that are connected to the network. In 
addition, in many countries, a significant proportion of households report missing or 
zero expenditure on water even if they report using piped water on premises as their 
main source of drinking water. Quantities for these households must be imputed from 
the other households within the sample. 
In some countries, we only have data on tariff structures for some service areas, 
which means that, for a significant proportion of connected households, we must use 
average prices and quantities consumed from those areas with data.  We have 
explained how we impute quantities in the sub-section 2.2.1.4, and we have 
discussed that this limitation is more important in countries like Nigeria and 
Bangladesh. This could affect the distributional impact of subsidies across deciles, 
the calculation of omega and the calculation of inclusion and exclusion errors, but it 
is not clear in which direction. Having said this, the main driver of regressivity is the 
lack of access or connection. The unavailability of data on expenditure or tariffs 
would not affect these measures. However, they could affect the magnitude of the 
regressivity for conditional on being connected.  
The definition of service area may be too large and inaccurate, and this may 
overestimate the actual number of households with potential access to the piped 
water network. This may affect the calculation of Omega and underestimates the 
magnitude of the impact of access factors on targeting performance. It will not, 
however, affect the distributional impact analysis of subsidies nor the calculation of 
the errors of inclusion or exclusion. Additionally, we are comparing countries with 
varying proportions of rural populations and differing degrees to which piped water is 
a feasible solution to close the access gap. 
One of the main strengths of this study is that it uses representative samples that 





connected to piped water. Studies that restrict their sample to only those households 
for which water quantity data are available fail to be representative at the country 
level. If the objective of policy makers is to use limited public funds to help the 
poorest access safely managed water, then the strengths of our approach outweigh 
its limitations.  
3 FINDINGS 
3.1 Distributional performance of existing subsidies 
In this section we show the estimated overall distributional incidence of water 
consumption subsidies across households by expenditure decile (or income decile for 
El Salvador and Panama). 
As explained in Section 2.2.2, each figure shows the percentage of subsidy captured 
by each decile (i.e., percentage of money spent on subsidies accruing to all 
households in the given decile, classifying all households in the country along the 
countrywide expenditure distribution). In addition, we present the share of total 
household income or expenditure on goods and services in the economy accruing to 
each expenditure decile and compare it with the share of subsidies accruing to each 
decile. When the subsidy distribution is more skewed toward richer deciles than the 
distribution of expenditure or income, it is regressive and increases inequality. If the 
subsidy shares are less skewed toward richer deciles that total expenditure, but still 
regressive, they can be regressive but inequality reducing.  
Presented in Figure 3, the estimates for the five African countries demonstrate a 
common trend: richer households appear to enjoy a greater share of subsidies. In 
Niger and Uganda, households in the top decile are estimated to receive over 60 
percent of all water consumption subsidies. In Mali, Niger, and Uganda, the estimates 
show that the poorest hardly benefit from the subsidy at all. Furthermore, Nigeria 
seems to be the only country where subsidies reduce rather than increase inequality 
according to these estimates. Table 4 further shows summary measures of 
distributional incidence. It shows that the subsidies are most regressive in Niger, with 
the top 20% of households receiving almost 85% of subsidies and the bottom poorest 
households receiving 0%. 
Figure 4 shows the estimated distribution of beneficiaries (households that receive 
the subsidy) across expenditure deciles for the same five countries to complement 
the picture painted by distributional incidence. This figure helps to visualise the poor 
performance of these susbsidies in targeting the poor by presenting the number of 
beneficiaries rather than the value of subsidies received across the deciles of total 
expenditure. Higher deciles appear to show the highest share of total subsidy 
beneficiaries (dark grey bars) and the highest share of all households within each 
decile that are beneficiaries (ligh grey bars). The differences between the top three 
deciles and the remaining ones are remarkable in all countries, although less 
pronounced in Nigeria. As noted above, in Niger, the poor (first four deciles) do not 





only the fourth decile shows a very small amount of beneficiaries. We conclude that 
in the five African countries analyzed, and using the household data, tariff data, and 
the methodology described, consumption subsidies are regressive (albeit relatively 
less so in Nigeria) and not well targeted to the poor. This seems to be due to the 
poor appearing to have less access to piped water and, even when connected, 
appearing to consume less water generally as shown in Table 5 and discussed in more 
detail in section 3.2. 
Table 4. Measures of distributional incidence of subsidies 
 
Percentages of subsidies accruing to each group of deciles of the 


















Ethiopia 0.54 1.56 82.60 55.76 35.71 153.87 
Mali 0.65 2.26 75.13 57.17 25.24 115.39 
Niger 0.00 0.12 84.54 70.00 577.43 22315.38 
Nigeria 10.82 21.79 41.15 28.44 1.30 3.81 
Uganda 1.27 1.27 84.76 68.69 54.16 66.83 
Average in 5 African countries 2.66 5.40 73.64 56.01 138.77 4531.06 
       
El Salvador 6.03 17.81 37.88 21.85 1.23 6.28 
Jamaica 7.46 19.70 41.78 24.65 1.25 5.60 
Panama 12.44 27.29 32.66 17.67 0.65 2.62 
Average in 3 Latin American 
countries 8.64 21.60 37.44 21.39 1.04 4.84 
       
Bangladesh 4.57 12.36 52.70 32.28 2.61 11.54 
Vietnam 12.62 30.30 26.19 14.20 0.47 2.07 
Average in 2 Asian countries 8.60 21.33 39.45 23.24 1.54 6.81 
       
Average across all countries 5.64 13.45 55.94 39.07 70.01 2268.34 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on household surveys, IBNET and administrative data on tariff 
structure, and cost-reflective tariff data. See the section on Methodology and Data and the Appendix for 
more detail. 
Note: All figures are calculated using sample weights. Total expenditure is total household expenditure 
in all categories of goods and services. The distribution of expenditure refers to the countrywide 







Figure 3. Distributional incidence of subsidies (by decile) for five African 
countries 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on household surveys, IBNET and administrative data on tariff 
structure, and cost-reflective tariff data. See section on Methodology and Data and the Appendix for 
more detail. 
Note: All figures are calculated using sample weights. Total expenditure is total household expenditure 
in all categories of goods and services. The distribution of expenditure refers to the countrywide 




Presented in Figure 5, the results for Panama, Jamaica, and El Salvador have a 
similar pattern, demonstrating subsidies’ regressivity. However, the figures suggest 
that subsidy schemes in all three Latin American countries reduce inequality since 
subsidy incidence is less skewed towards richer deciles than total 
expenditure/income. The degree of subsidy regressivity in Latin American countries 
is lower than in African countries, as evidenced by the average Palma and 20:20 
ratios shown in Table 4. As explored in section 3.2, this is partly because both a 
greater number of poor households reside in service areas, and that, conditional on 






















Figure 4. Distributional incidence of subsidy beneficiaries (by decile) for five 
African countries 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on household surveys, IBNET and administrative data on tariff 
structure, and cost-reflective tariff data. See the section on Methodology and Data and the Appendix for 
more detail. 
Note: Subsidy beneficiaries are households. All figures are calculated using sample weights. Total 
expenditure is total household expenditure in all categories. The distribution of expenditure refers to 
the countrywide distribution of expenditure per capita, i.e., households are ranked according to their 




Figure 6 shows the distribution of beneficiaries (households that receive the subsidy) 
across expenditure or income deciles for the three countries. As with the African 
countries, it complements the picture painted by the distributional incidence of the 
amount of subsidies. Higher deciles show the largest share of total subsidy 
beneficiaries (dark grey bars) and the largest share of all households within each 











Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on household surveys, administrative data, and cost-reflective 
tariff data. See the section on Methodology and Data and the Appendix for more detail. 
Note: All figures are calculated using sample weights. Total expenditure is total household expenditure 
in all categories. The distribution of expenditure (Jamaica) or income (El Salvador and Panama) refers 
to the countrywide distribution of expenditure/income per capita, i.e., households are ranked according 






Figure 6. Distributional incidence of subsidy beneficiaries (by decile) for three 




Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on household surveys, administrative data, and cost-reflective 
tariff data. See the section on Methodology and Data and the Appendix for more detail. 
Note: All figures are calculated using sample weights. Total expenditure is total household expenditure 
in all categories. The distribution of expenditure (Jamaica) or income (El Salvador and Panama) refers 
to the countrywide distribution of expenditure/income per capita, i.e., households are ranked according 
to their expenditure/income per capita. 
 
Figure 7 shows the results for two Asian countries, Bangladesh and Vietnam. In 
Bangladesh, water consumption subsidies are strongly regressive and increase 
inequality. While subsidies in Vietnam are still regressive, albeit less so, they are 
actually inequality reducing, suggesting slightly better targeting compared to 
Bangladesh. Figure 8, which depicts the distribution of beneficiary households across 
deciles, shows strong regressivity in Bangladesh but a more even distribution across 
expenditure deciles in Vietnam, once again suggesting better targeting. 
In the next section, we look at a more synthetic measure of targeting performance 
that complements this analysis and consider both access and subsidy design factors 







Figure 7. Distributional incidence of subsidies (incidence by deciles) for two Asian 
countries 
  
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on household surveys, administrative data, and cost-reflective 
tariff data. See the section on Methodology and Data and the Appendix for more detail. 
Note: All figures are calculated using sample weights. Total expenditure is total household expenditure 
in all categories. The distribution of expenditure refers to the countrywide distribution of expenditure 
per capita, i.e., households are ranked according to their expenditure per capita. 
 
Figure 8. Distributional incidence of subsidy beneficiaries (incidence by deciles) 
for two Asian countries 
  
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on household surveys, administrative data, and cost-reflective 
tariff data. See the section on Methodology and Data and the Appendix for more detail. 
Note: Subsidy beneficiaries are households. All figures are calculated using sample weights. Total 
expenditure is total household expenditure in all categories. The distribution of expenditure (Jamaica) 
or income (El Salvador and Panama) refers to the countrywide distribution of expenditure/income per 
capita, i.e., households are ranked according to their expenditure/income per capita. 
 
 
3.2 Targeting performance of existing subsidies: Are subsidies pro-poor? 
Figure 9 and Table 5 show the targeting performance of water consumption subsidies 
in the 10 countries under analysis. Figure 9 shows how access factors (SA*C) and 
subsidy design factors (B*R) drive omega (Ω) across countries. Table 5 presents the 
values of each factor for each country. Factor values below 1 indicate that the factor 
contributes to reduced targeting performance, whereas factor values above 1 
indicate that the factor contributes to increased performance. 
As shown in Figure 9, all African, Latin American, and Asian countries present Ω 





to the most vulnerable populations. Access factors (blue dots) are the driving force 
explaining low Ω values in most countries. Subsidy design factors (red dots) are in 
general around or above 1. These indicators suggest that government improvement 
strategies should mainly focus on increasing access to services (for each country, we 
explore whether strategies should primarily focus on expanding service areas, 
increasing the proportion of connected households within existing service areas, or 
both in detail for each country), although enhancing subsidy design could also be 
beneficial. 
Figure 9. Factors driving the targeting performance of subsidies (Ω) across 
countries 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on household surveys, administrative data, and cost-reflective 
tariff data. See the section on Methodology and Data and the Appendix for more detail. 
Notes: Country labels: BGD: Bangladesh, ETH: Ethiopia, JAM: Jamaica, MLI: Mali, NER: Niger, NGA: 
Nigeria, UGA: Uganda, PAN: Panama, SLV: El Salvador, VNM: Vietnam. Access factors: SA = SAP/SAH is 
the share of households located in a service area for the poor relative to the population as a whole; C = 
CP|SA/CH|SA is the relative share of households that are connected to the service conditional on potential 
access (being located in a service area). Subsidy design factors: B = BP|C/BH|C is the relative proportion 
of households with a subsidy conditional on usage; R = RP|B/RH|B is the relative average rate of 
subsidization. Factor values below 1 indicate that the factor contributes to reduced targeting 
performance, whereas factor values above 1 indicate that the factor contributes to increased targeting 
performance. 
 
Different factors influence the severity of poor subsidy targeting performance across 
countries. In Table 5 we explore the different access and subsidy design factors in 
more detail. 
Four African countries—Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, and Uganda—show an estimated value 
of Ω lower than 0.1. In all four the main factors that reduce subsidy efficiency in 





lower probability of being located in a service area and (ii) their lower probability of 
being connected to a water network conditional on being located in a service area. 
Additionally, in Ethiopia and Niger, the relatively low water quantities consumed by 
the poor significantly decrease the targeting performance. 
Nigeria shows an Ω above 0.5, revealing a significant problem, although less acute 
than in Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, and Uganda. SA, C, and Q are closer to 1, and B = 1 and 
R = 1.03. Consistent with the evidence in the previous section, Nigeria’s 
distributional incidence of subsidies by decile is regressive, although less pronounced 
than in the other four African countries.  
In order to improve the targeting performance of water consumption subsidies, these 
governments should expand the service area (i.e., SA) of their utilities and connect 
more households within this service area (i.e., C) to the water network. One way to 
do this is by implementing connection subsidies in areas where there is already 
network infrastructure present (Andres et al, 2019, discuss different types of 
connection subsidies and beneficiaries and the relevant considerations when thinking 
of how to design them depending on the context). Table A2 in the Appendix shows 
the number of households that are not connected to the network that use a public 
tap, which could be connected to the existing infrastructure. This varies significantly 
across countries and across households classified as rural, urban and poor. Such 
considerations are important when planning connection subsidies for a specific 
context. Additionally, these countries should improve the design of their water 
consumption subsidies to better target poor households (increasing B to values over 
1). 
In El Salvador, Jamaica, and Panama, the problem is less acute, with an Ω of 0.84, 
0.69, and 0.86 respectively. In these countries the factors lowering Ω to below 1 are 
different. In all three, the probability of living in a service area is high for both types 
of households, poor and nonpoor (SA is close to 1). However, connection rates 
conditional on location in a service area and water quantities consumed are both 
significantly lower for poor households, driving Ω to below 1. These countries would 
benefit from increasing service connection rates, as well as improving subsidy design 
to better target the poor (resulting in the increase of variables B and R further above 
1).  
Bangladesh falls in between African and Latin American countries, with an Ω of 0.35. 
Both the variables SA and C are low in general, and lower for poor households. Water 
quantities consumed by the poor are similar to those of other households, but this is 
potentially driven by the lack of information on households’ expenditures and the 
flat rates being charged, which complicates imputing Bangladesh’s household-specific 
water consumption (therefore, a median consumption quantity is assumed for most 
households). A parameter Q close to 1 is potentially reasonable given that any 
connected household regardless of consumption pays a flat rate. Nonetheless, 
potentially all factors (SA, C, B, R), in addition to the tariff structure, could be 
improved. In Vietnam, the value for Ω is much higher, though still below 1, and a 





Table 5. Decomposing the targeting performance of water consumption subsidies 
 Ω SA C B R Q 















Rate of subsidization 




Ethiopia 0.047      
Poor  0.255 0.095 1.000 0.957 3.275 
All  0.446 0.444 0.996 0.964 8.567 
Poor/All  0.571 0.214 1.004 0.993 0.382 
       
Mali 0.085      
Poor  0.036 0.263 0.907 0.858 14.491 
All  0.239 0.467 0.958 0.793 14.751 
Poor/All  0.150 0.563 0.948 1.081 0.982 
       
Niger 0.006      
Poor  0.030 0.040 1.000 0.921 10.453 
All  0.209 0.433 1.000 0.909 23.651 
Poor/All  0.141 0.093 1.000 1.014 0.442 
       
Nigeria 0.661      
Poor  0.507 0.208 0.997 0.929 3.270 
All  0.585 0.233 0.993 0.900 3.972 
Poor/All  0.867 0.894 1.004 1.032 0.823 
       
Uganda 0.079      
Poor  0.204 0.045 1.000 0.544 5.173 
All  0.332 0.261 1.000 0.549 6.965 
Poor/All  0.610 0.17 1.00 0.99 0.740 
       
El Salvador 0.839      
Poor  0.945 0.719 0.996 0.679 19.230 
All  0.966 0.821 0.983 0.647 20.863 
Poor/All  0.977 0.876 1.013 1.050 0.922 
       
Jamaica 0.718      
Poor  0.998 0.575 0.967 0.764 10.643 
All  0.998 0.698 0.955 0.653 14.456 
Poor/All  1.000 0.823 1.013 1.170 0.736 
       
Panama 0.859      
Poor  1.000 0.826 1.000 0.872 40.497 
All  1.000 0.919 1.000 0.829 44.518 
Poor/All  1.000 0.898 1.000 1.052 0.910 
       
Bangladesh 0.345      
Poor  0.286 0.164 0.998 0.999 36.555 
All  0.384 0.355 0.998 0.995 36.579 
Poor/All  0.745 0.462 1.000 1.003 0.999 
       
Vietnam 0.858      
Poor  0.804 0.627 1.000 0.861 13.863 
All  0.840 0.631 1.000 0.858 15.430 
Poor/All  0.958 0.993 1.000 1.004 0.898 
       
Source: Authors’ own calculations using country-specific household surveys, administrative data, and 
estimated cost-reflective tariffs. 
Note: Access factors: SA =SAP/SAH is the share of households located in a service area for the poor 
relative to the population as a whole; C = CP|SA/CH|SA is the relative share of households that are 
connected to the service conditional on potential access (being located in a service area). Subsidy 
design factors: B = BP|C/BH|C is the relative proportion of households with a subsidy conditional on usage; 
R = RP|B/RH|B is the relative average rate of subsidization; Q = QP|B/QH|B are relative average  quantities 
consumed. A factor value below 1 indicates that the factor contributes to reduced targeting 
performance, whereas a value above 1 indicates that the factor contributes to increased targeting 
performance. All figures are calculated using sample weights. Poor households are defined as belonging 






Table 6 shows the errors of inclusion (the proportion of subsidy beneficiary 
households that are in the top six deciles, or rich) and the error of exclusion (the 
proportion of poor households that do not receive a water consumption subsidy). 
These errors are not conditional on location in a service area or connection, so they 
differ from those in Table 5.  The estimates show that for most countries covered 
here the errors of exclusion range from 78 percent to nearly 100 percent, except for 
Jamaica, Panama, and Vietnam (column 2). This is consistent with the very low levels 
of Ω presented in Table 5. The countries on the lower end of this spectrum exhibit 
errors of exclusion around 50 percent, suggesting that their level of outreach to the 
poor could still be improved. 
Inclusion errors (column 1 of Table 6) are extremely high in all countries, suggesting 
a wide margin for the improvement of targeting, consistent with the analysis 
presented so far. The inclusion errors are particularly high in African countries, with 
figures close to 100 percent in all countries besides Nigeria. Bangladesh also stands 
out with figures close to 90 percent. 
Table 6. Water consumption subsidies, errors of inclusion and exclusion 
 Error of inclusion (%) Error of exclusion (%) 
 (1) (2) 
Ethiopia 96.01 97.57 
Mali 97.82 99.15 
Niger 99.73 99.93 
Nigeria 74.35 89.59 
Uganda 98.28 99.60 
El Salvador 82.01 78.27 
Jamaica 51.78 51.78 
Panama 71.20 38.91 
Bangladesh 87.67 95.45 
Vietnam 66.51 50.28 
Source: Authors' own calculations using country-specific household surveys, administrative data, and 
estimated cost-reflective tariffs. 
Note: Poor households are defined as belonging to the first four deciles of the expenditure (or income) 
distribution in each country. Error of inclusion is measured by the percentage of all beneficiary 
households that are rich; error of exclusion is measured by the percentage of poor households that do 







4 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
This paper provides new evidence on the recent performance of piped water 
consumption subsidies in terms of pro-poor targeting for 10 low and middle-income 
countries around the world.  
We use detailed household survey data with information on whether the households’ 
main source of drinking water is from piped water to define access, and the 
households’ monthly expenditure on water services combined with available 
information on tariff structures in each country to impute water quantities and unit 
prices paid by each household. We supplement this information with new estimates 
of the cost incurred by the supplier of providing piped water to households to 
calculate the average subsidy per unit of water consumed at the household level. 
Our accounting methodology presents some limitations, most importantly due to the 
lack of information on water quantity consumed at the household level and the tariff 
structure faced by each household in each country. This means that water quantities 
have to be imputed. Furthermore, the tariff structures for some households have to 
be assumed based upon suppliers operating in other regions within the same country. 
Finally, we are comparing countries with varying levels of urbanization and rural 
contexts. As a result, piped water is more feasible to close the access gap in some 
countries than in others.  
With these caveats in mind, our analysis of ten low- and middle-income countries 
suggests that piped water is substantially subsidized, as existing tariffs do not seem 
to fully recover the costs of service provision. Moreover, these consumption subsidies 
do not appear to efficiently address service gaps among the poor due to ineffective 
targeting.  
Overall, we find that water consumption subsidies in all 10 countries are regressive 
and therefore do not adequately target the poor (the estimated Ω has a value under 
1 in all cases, with an average value of 0.45 across all 10 countries). This is despite 
their high diversity of economic development, national income levels, proportion of 
rural populations, piped-water coverage, and the costs of producing and distributing 
piped water. We also determine that the severity of regressivity varies significantly 
(from 0.006 in Niger to 0.87 in Panama). On average, across the 10 low and middle-
income countries examined, 56% of subsidies end up in the pockets of the richest 20% 
but only 6% of subsidies find their way to the poorest 20%. 
Only a very small number of poor households benefit from subsidies, particularly 
within the African countries in our sample. This is because poor households are less 
likely to be located in areas serviced by utility providers (the variable SA in the 
analysis), and even where they are, they are less likely to be connected and 
consuming piped water (variable C) than the general population.  
This suggests that access factors primarily drive this poor targeting performance (SA 
takes a value of 0.7 and C takes a value of 0.6 on average across all 10 countries). 





0.47 and average C of 0.39 across the sample used) and Bangladesh (which has a SA 
of 0.75 but a C of 0.46). This is expected since these countries have large rural 
populations, aggravating the feasibility of extending the network to new service 
areas. However, connection rates are far from 100% even in urban areas in these 
countries (Table 2), implying that there is also scope to improve connection rates. 
Furthermore, in Ethiopia, Mali and Niger, available data shows that there is a 
significant proportion of households that are not connected to the network and that 
use a public tap as the main source of drinking water, both in urban and rural areas 
(Table A2 in the Appendix). This could indicate the potential feasibility of increasing 
connection rates for these households.  
Aside from improving access for the poor, subsidy design could also be improved to 
better target the poor. The share of poor households that receive a subsidy 
conditional on being connected to the network relative to the equivalent share for 
the whole population (B) averages at 0.99 and the rate of subsidization conditional 
on receiving a subsidy for the poor relative to the equivalent rate for the whole 
population (R) averages at 1.02, across all 10 countries. This signals a need for 
improvement in subsidy design even given subpar network coverage and connection 
rates. This trend is observed in all countries. 
It is worth noting that there is not an optimal value of omega; it is a policy choice 
that will vary across countries according to their particular fairness preferences and 
political equilibriums. If the objective is to use available and limited public funds to 
ensure poor households can access and consume piped water in an affordable and 
sustainable way, then an omega below 1 demonstrates that this objective is not 
being achieved. 
To summarize, our results show that in most developing countries, improving the 
targeting of current water consumption subsidy schemes to the poorest households 
will primarily require improving their access to the service. This is because, by 
definition, unconnected households are excluded from the pool of subsidy 
beneficiaries. Therefore, network expansion into poorer neighborhoods, if 
technologically feasible, and policies that facilitate household connections should be 
pursued. Angel-Urdinola and Wodon (2012) provide evidence from Nicaragua that 
increased access rates among the poor over time improves the targeting performance 
of water consumption subsidies. 
It is also important to note that the targeting performance of connection subsidies 
would also depend on the context, design of the subsidy, and the behavior of both 
utilities and households. For example, universal connection subsidies were simulated 
by Komives et al (2005) assuming all unconnected households were offered and 
accepted a subsidized connection. In countries where the proportion of unconnected 
households is higher among the poor than among the overall population, subsidies are 
likely to be pro-poor. Yet in practice, poor households may be located in areas more 
difficult to reach or face additional financial or technical barriers to connection, such 
as the inability to afford the fixtures required to connect to the network, preventing 





In countries where water access is no longer a significant issue and connection rates 
are relatively high, such as El Salvador, Jamaica and Panama, simply modifying a 
subsidy’s design could greatly improve its targeting of the poor. In some countries, 
quantity-based subsidies are used in combination with subsidies targeted using 
administrative selection. But in other countries, only administrative selection, like 
geographic targeting or mean-testing, is used. In general, administrative selection 
performs better than quantity-based subsidies in targeting the poor (Komives et al, 
2006). Having said this, the error of exclusion can be quite high, since in an effort to 
target the poor accurately, a significant proportion of poor households are excluded. 
Further detailed analysis of each context would be needed to design the most cost-
effective set of policy instruments for improving the pro-poor performance of 
consumption subsidies, including those that improve access to safely managed water 
among the poor. The most desirable approach will vary across, and even within, 
countries. It will depend on state capacity to implement more refined and explicit 
mechanisms to target the poor, such as administrative selection, as well as whether 
the poor live in areas with an existing water network, whether they are able to 
undertake the necessary upgrades within the home for connection, and whether 
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Table A1 below describes the household surveys and a breakdown of the samples by 
whether they are connected or not to the network and the information available to 
calculate water quantities consumed. 
Construction of water connection variables at the household level 
1. Ethiopia: Connected to piped water is defined as main source of drinking 
water in rainy season reported to be piped water into dwelling or into 
yard/plot (hh_s9q13 = 1 or 2), or and the same for the dry season (hh_s9q14 = 
1 or 2). There is no information about using a neighbor’s tap. Households can 
report using water from a piped water public tap/standpipe in each of the 
seasons (hh_s9q13==3 or hh_s9q14==3) 
2. Mali: Connected to piped water is defined as L08_E = 1. Using a public tap is 
L08_E==4 and using a neighbor’s tap is Lo08_E=2. 
3. Niger: Connected to piped water is defined as MS06Q13 = 1. Households using 
public taps are those for which q6_18=14 and those using a neighbors’ tap are 
q6_18=13. 
4. Nigeria: Connected to piped water is defined as s11q33a = 1 or 2 (in dry 
season) or s11q33b = 1 or 2 (in wet season). No information on whether they 
use neighbors’ tap or public taps available. 
5. Uganda: Connected to piped water is defined as H9q7 = 10 (piped water into 
dwelling), or H9q7 = 11 (piped water to the yard). 
6. El Salvador: Connected to network water services (piped water) is defined as 
r312 = 1, 2, 3, 4, 4.1, 6. (ANDA is the state-owned piped-water provider that 
directly serves around 30 percent of the households in the sample.). 
Households using neighbor’s tap are those with r313==1 and those using public 
taps are those with r313==2 
7. Jamaica: Connected to piped water is defined as i22 = 1 or 2. Public tap is 
i22=3. There is no information about neighbor’s tap.  
8. Panama: Connected to piped water is defined as v1j_ubicac= 1 (inside on-
plot) or 2 (outside on-plot). Public tap is v1j_ubicac=4 and neighbor’s tap is 
v1j_ubicac=3. There was no information on the enumeration area (EA) in 
2015, but in 2014 there was information about access and EA (but no 
information on expenditure, so 2015 is used). Water access is equal to 1 for 
all households, so we assume access is equal to 1 for all households in 2015 as 
well.  
9. Bangladesh: Connected to piped water (supply water) is defined as s6aq12 = 
1, s6aq15 = 1, or s6aq16 = 1. The survey does not distinguish between type of 
piped water (on-plot, neighbor’s tap, public tap). 
10. Vietnam: Connected to piped water is defined as m6c10 = 1 (individual tap). 
Households using public taps are those with m6c10=2. There is no information 






Table A1 Socio-economic household surveys 
















































Year 2015/16 2014 2014 2015/16 2013/14 2016 2012 2015 2016 2015 
Total sample 4,954 5,462 3,617 4,560 3,117 20,609 6,579 11,502 46,034 
 
5,000 
Rural (%) 66% 56% 64% 68% 74% 46% 60% 44% 70% 42% 
Poor (%) 27% 23% 22% 38% 32% 39% 32% 41% 40% 25% 
           
Not connected 3,688 4,663 2,912 3,994 2,798 4,960 2,269 1,208 41,354 2,460 
Not in serviced area 2,485 3,812  2,201 2,169 1,967 4,315 19 0 29,256 820 
In serviced area 1,203 851 711 1,825 831 645 2,250 1,208 12,098 1,640 
 
          
Connected 1,266 799 705 566 319 15,649 4,310 10,294 4,680 2,540 
With (volumetric) Tariff data 
*a 
525 799 705 201 113 6,649 4,310 10,294 1,156 1,611 
… & positive water expenditure 417 753 646 51 102 6,312 2,952 10,262 42 1,586 
… & no positive water expenditure 108 46 59 150 11 337 1,358 2,051 1,114 25 
No Tariff data 741 n/a n/a 365 206 9,000 n/a 0 3,524 918 
           
Source: Authors’ compilation. Note: These are all socio-economic surveys, which include information about income sources and expenditure on a range of goods and 
services but are not specific surveys to capture piped water used. Poor households are defined as belonging to deciles one to four of the expenditure per capita (or income 














Households using public taps 
(%) 
 
Households using neighbor’s 
tap (%) 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 Total Rural Urban Poor Total Rural Urban Poor 
Ethiopia 30% 34% 18% 32% . . . . 
Mali 23% 14% 42% 10% 4% 1% 10% 1% 
Niger 20% 18% 29% 18% 2% 1% 7% 0% 
Nigeria . . . . . . . . 
Uganda 10% 5% 23% 5% . . . . 
El Salvador 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 6% 4% 6% 
Jamaica 7% 11% 3% 12% . . . . 
Panama 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Bangladesh . . . . . . . . 
Vietnam 6% 4% 7% 6% . . . . 
Source: See sources to Table A1. 
Tariff structure and imputation of quantities, unit prices, and subsidies 
As explained in the section on Methodology and Data, the tariff data are taken from 
IBNET in most cases, and the year corresponds to the closest available to when the 
household survey was conducted. It is worth noting further specificities of each 
country when imputing quantities, unit prices, and subsidies: 
1. Ethiopia: Each city or region has its own provider. There is only information 
on tariff structure for nine areas, so we compute the unit price paid by all 
households in areas we have information for and use this unit price for other 
households connected to water, and then combine this information with 
expenditures to impute quantities and calculate subsidies. Information from 
IBNET was used for the utilities listed in Table A3. 
 
Table A3 Utilities and tariff structure used in Ethiopia 
Utility 
Year of tariff structure 
used 
Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority 2014 
Ambo Water Supply 2013 
Dire Dawa Water Supply and Sewerage Authority 2007 
Debremarkos Water Supply and Sewerage Service Office 2013 
Dessie Water Supply 2013 
Gondar Water Supply and Sewerage Service Office 2013 
Shashemene Water Supply and Sewerage Service Enterprise 2013 
Mekelle Water Supply Service Office 2013 
Wukro Water Supply Service Office 2013 
Source: IBNET database. 
 
2. Mali: There is only one water supplier, Société Malienne de Gestion de l’Eau 
Potable, in the country and we have information on the tariff structure from 





3. Niger: There is only one water supplier, Societe De Patrimoine Des Eaux Du 
Niger, in the country and we have information about the tariff structure from 
IBNET for the year 2009. 
4. Nigeria: IBNET covers nine utility providers in the states of Ekiti, Enugu, 
Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Oyo, Plateau, and the city of Lagos. Abuja has 
been sourced from Abubakar (2016). There are many other providers in each 
of the 37 regions covered by the household survey, but tariff structure data 
are not accessible. Hence, we impute the fixed rate as the average of the 
effective fixed rate charged in each of the states, we do have information 
for, using the few households for which self-reported water expenditure is 
positive (202 nairas per cubic meter). Around 75 percent of connected 
households report zero expenditure on water. 
Table A4 Utilities and tariff structure used in Nigeria 
Utility Year of tariff structure used 
Ekiti State Water Corporation 2018 
Enugu State Water Corporation 2008 
Kaduna State Water Board 2018 
Kano State Water Board 2013 
Katsina State Water Board 2015 
Niger State Water Board 2018 
Oyo State Water Corporation 2018 
Plateau State Water Board 2012 
Lagos Water Corporation 2017 
Source: IBNET database. 
 
5. Uganda: There is only one provider of piped water in the IBNET data, Uganda 
National Water & Sewerage Corporation, and there is no information to 
identify which households in the survey get piped water from this provider. 
Hence, we use the tariff structure of this provider to impute quantities and 
subsidies paid by all households connected to piped water. The tariff 
structure is from the year 2017. 
6. El Salvador: There is one big public provider of piped water, Administración 
de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (ANDA), and many other local suppliers. 
However, we only have information on the tariff structure for ANDA clients 
for the year 2015, and hence we use this tariff structure for households 
connected to ANDA to get parameters T, R, and Q and to analyze the 
distributional performance of subsidies. The tariff structure is a volume-
differentiated tariff (VDT) with extra charges for sewerage. In addition, most 
of the ANDA-connected households have a toilet connected to the sewerage 
services so we assume that all pay the extra charge and calculate quantities 
based on the complete tariff structure for water and sewerage services. Even 
though VDTs are known to be better at targeting subsidies to the poor, the 
current tariff structure has a big number of brackets that are difficult to 
rationalize from the perspective of best policy design.  
7. Jamaica: Tariffs are IBTs with a fixed cost. However, around 70 percent of 
the water supply was free of charge (nonrevenue water) in 2013 according to 





reported having access to piped water report zero expenditure, contributing 
to nonrevenue water.24 In the household analysis for those households that 
are connected but report no expenditure on water, we impute the average 
water consumption of 16 m3 and unit price of zero.25 We use tariff structure 
data from IBNET for the National Water Commission for the year 2016. 
8. Panama: Tariffs are IBTs with an initial fixed charge for consumption under 30 
m3. There are different providers, but all have the same tariff structure and 
levels and by law utility companies have to charge cost-reflective tariffs and 
avoid cross-subsidies, to promote rational and efficient water consumption 
and efficient supply and demand.26 We use tariff structure data from IBNET 
for the Instituto de Acueductos y Alcantarillados Nacionales (IDAAN) for 2016. 
9. Bangladesh: Most households report water expenditure equal to zero, even if 
connected to piped water. In addition, many of the utility providers charge a 
flat rate (16 out of the 23 with available data in IBNET). Hence it is difficult 
to calculate the quantity consumed and unit price. Of the seven districts with 
providers that charge a nonflat rate (Brahmanbaria, Chittagong, Dhaka, 
Jhalokati, Lakshmipur, Manikganj, and Sherpur), only households in 
Chittagong, Dhaka, and Manikganj report positive values of expenditure on 
water; the rest report zero expenditure. We calculate the quantity consumed 
and unit price for households that report positive expenditure in areas where 
there is a nonflat rate, so that quantity can be estimated. This is a very 
restrictive sample, but it is the only way to get an approximation of the 
quantities consumed and the price paid and hence of the Ω indicator, 
assuming all households that are connected consume the average quantity of 
those households with positive expenditure for which quantities can be 
estimated. In practice, we use the tariff structure for the following seven 
utilities that do not charge a flat rate from IBNET to calculate unit prices and 
quantities consumed. 
Table A5 Utilities and tariff structure used in Bangladesh 
Utility Year of tariff structure used 
CWASA, Chittagong 2015 
DWASA, Dhaka and Naryanganj 2015 
MaP, Manikganj 2015 
Lakshmipur 2015 
Jhalakathi Pourashava 2015 
SHP, Sherpur 2015 
Brahmanbaria Pourashava 2015 
Source: IBNET database. 
 
24 The National Water Commission (NWC 2013: 152) proposes that one of the main reasons 
that households report being connected but make zero expenditure is due to illegal 
connections. 
25 According to NWC (2013), the average consumption per residential connection per month is 
around 16 m3 (see figure 7.4 in NWC [2013], which reports 3,600 imperial gallons per 
residential connection per month, equivalent to 16 m3). 
26 See Autoridad Nacional de Servicios Publicos: 
http://www.asep.gob.pa/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=139&Itemid=142 






10. Vietnam: We have information about the tariff structure for only three utility 
providers serving some of the largest of the five provinces covered by the 
household survey. We use that information for households, plus impute unit 
prices and quantities for the other two areas using the median of the 
estimated price and quantities for those for which we have area-specific 
information. Vietnam has a large number of utility providers (around 180) 
scattered over the roughly 60 provinces in the national territory. Table A6 
lists the information from IBNET that we use in practice in the analysis. 
Table A6 Utilities and tariff structure in Vietnam 
Utility Year of tariff structure used 
Hanoi Water Supply Co. Ltd, Ha Noi City 2015 
Sai Gon Water Supply Corporation, Ho Chi 
Minh City 
2013 
Binh Duong Water Supply, Sewerage and 
Environment Co. Ltd, Thu Dau Mot City 
2016 
Source: IBNET database. 
 
 
 
